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Abstract—Defects in requirements specifications can have 
severe consequences during the software development lifecycle. 
Some of them result in overall project failure due to incorrect or 
missing quality characteristics such as security. There are several 
concerns that make security difficult to deal with; for instance, 
(1) when stakeholders discuss general requirements in (review) 
meetings, they are often not aware that they should also discuss 
security-related topics, and (2) they typically do not have enough 
security expertise. These concerns become even more challenging 
in agile development contexts, where lightweight documentation 
is typically involved. The goal of this paper is to design and 
evaluate an approach to support reviewing security-related 
aspects in agile requirements specifications of web applications. 
The designed approach considers user stories and security 
specifications as input and relates those user stories to security 
properties via Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques. 
Based on the related security properties, our approach then 
identifies high-level security requirements from the Open Web 
Application Security Project (OWASP) to be verified and 
generates a focused reading techniques to support reviewers in 
detecting detects. We evaluate our approach via two controlled 
experiment trials. We compare the effectiveness and efficiency of 
novice inspectors verifying security aspects in agile requirements 
using our reading technique against using the complete list of 
OWASP high-level security requirements. The (statistically 
significant) results indicate that using the reading technique has 
a positive impact (with very large effect size) on the performance 
of inspectors in terms of effectiveness and efficiency.  
Keywords — agile requirements, software security, requirements 
verification, software inspection.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Requirements Engineering (RE) is an inherently complex 
part of software engineering. Misunderstandings and defects in 
requirements-related artifacts can easily lead to design flaws 
and cause severe and costly problems [24]. Agile requirements 
engineering relies on lightweight documentation and face-to-
face collaborations between customers and developers [9]. Yet, 
agility does not necessarily compensate the problems of more 
plan-driven software process models. In fact, it can even make 
those problems more explicit if a key prerequisite for 
successful RE is not given: human-intensive exchange, 
collaboration, and trust [19]. In other words, agile RE has 
already helped to address some specific problems of RE, but it 
has also brought others to the surface [20]. 
Security is an essential non-functional requirement that 
requires special attention, inter alia, due to business needs to 
protect data. Much of security-related information is hosted on 
the internet, making web applications a target. Security 
requirements often appear throughout but also beyond the 
elicitation process so that stakeholders are often simply not 
aware of them. For instance, when stakeholders make decisions 
along the process meetings, they are often not aware that these 
decisions might also raise data protection-related issues [24]. 
This often leads to not specifying relevant security-related 
aspects.  
However, the picture is even more challenging in agile 
methods. Several studies have identified problems that could 
result from the poorly detailed requirements specifications 
[9][34]. These problems can result in overall project failure due 
to incorrect or missing functionalities and/or quality 
characteristics. According to Eberlein and Leite [15], there is a 
need for agile methods to include techniques that make it 
possible to identify non-functional requirements early.  There 
is also a need to describe them in such a way that their early 
analysis may happen, thus reducing the likelyhood of costly 
rework [30]. In that sense, agile RE should include more 
detailed requirements verification into the process [15][34].  
Despite the apparent advantages of integrating security into 
agile contexts, a recent mapping study by Villamizar et al. 
identified that there is a lack of research on security 
requirements verification [42]. Such activities should be 
conducted to assure that agile requirements specifications are 
correct, consistent, unambiguous, and complete. This means 
properly covering security-related aspects, such as task-flow 
constraints, information flow, and assignment of administrative 
privileges. 
Given this scenario, our work aims at contributing to 
closing the literature and industry gaps that exist with respect 
to security requirements verification in agile contexts. More 
specifically, our goal is to propose and evaluate an approach 
for reviewing security-related aspects in agile requirements 
specifications of web applications. To achieve this goal, we 
define the following Specific Goals (SG):  
– SG1: We aim at developing an approach for reviewing 
security-related aspects in agile requirements specifications of 
web applications.  
– SG2: We evaluate the approach to analyze whether it helps 
inspectors to review security-related aspects. To this end, we 
report on a controlled experiment to observe the impact on 
effectiveness and efficiency. Additionally, we also observe the 
perceived usefulness and ease of use. 
As a result of our work, we found that using our approach 
had a positive impact (with very large effect size) when 
reviewing security-related aspects in agile specifications of 
web applications. Our results indicate significant differences 
when comparing the performance of inspectors using our 
approach versus other defect-based technique. 
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Section 
2 introduces the background on agile requirements engineering 
and on how security verification is typically performed in this 
context. Section 3 introduces the approach we designed for 
reviewing security-related aspects in agile requirements 
specifications of web applications. Section 4 presents the study 
design used to evaluate the approach. The results are presented 
and discussed in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. Section 7 
provides a discussion of limitations of our approach before we 
conclude with Section 8.  
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
This section introduces the background on agile and 
security requirements and describes work related to security 
requirements verification in agile context. 
A. Agile Requirements 
The term “agile requirements engineering” emerged in 
response to the agile manifesto in 2001. It is used to define the 
‘‘agile way’’ of planning, executing and reasoning about 
requirements engineering activities [25]. Yet, not much is 
known about the challenges posed by the collaboration-
oriented agile way of dealing with requirements engineering 
activities. Ramesh et al. [35] performed a multi-case study with 
16 organizations that develop software using agile methods. 
They identified that agile RE practices resulted in challenges 
regarding neglected non-functional requirements, minimum 
documentation and no requirements verifications. The recent 
report from the “Naming the Pain in Requirements 
Engineering” (NaPiRE) initiative [20] extends the list of 
challenges with: (i) communication flaws between project 
teams and the customer, and (ii) underspecified requirements 
that remain too abstract and, thus, are not measurable. These 
observations give a picture on the difficulties of dealing with 
non-functional requirements in agile environments. It is 
reasonable to believe that security requirements are no different 
in this respect.  
B. Security Requirements (SR) 
Software development should be conducted with security in 
mind at all stages and it should not be an afterthought [30]. 
Developing secure software is not a trivial task due to the lack 
of security expertise in development teams and the inadequacy 
of existing methodologies to support developers who are not 
security experts [24]. Yet, in the majority of software projects, 
security is often dealt with in retrospective when the system 
has already been designed and put into operation [31].   
SR have traditionally been considered “quality” 
requirements [11], [13]. Like other quality requirements, they 
tend not to have simple yes/no satisfaction criteria (e.g., as 
acceptance criteria). Haley et al. [23] presents some challenges 
related to SR. First, people generally think about and express 
SR in terms of “bad things” (negative properties) to be 
prevented. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to measure 
negative properties. Second, for SR, the tolerance on “satisfied 
enough” is small, often zero, given the implications of non-
compliance. Moreover, stakeholders tend to want security 
requirement satisfaction to be very close to yes. Third, the 
effort stakeholders might be willing to dedicate to satisfying 
SR also depends on the likelihood and impact of a failure to 
comply with them. This is even more challenging in the 
context of agile software projects because, apparently, 
functionality is the primary focus in agile processes while non-
functional requirements are typically either ignored or ill-
defined [34]. 
C. SR Verification in Agile Context 
In general, several authors have worked on quality 
assurance methods for verifying the quality properties of 
different artifacts. One of the most compared and evaluated 
methods, in several experiments and studies, are inspection 
techniques. In that direction, we can name reading support 
techniques for defect detection such as Perspective-Based 
Reading (PBR) [3], Defect-Based Reading (DBR) [21] and 
Use-Based Reading (UBR) [45] that are well known and 
established. As far as security inspections are concerned, little 
work has been published (e.g., [10][14][16]) on how to 
support inspectors with detailed reading support for reviewing 
security related aspects.  
Elberzhager et al. [16] propose a model for security goals 
that involves guided checklists to support inspectors when 
checking security. They describe a step-by-step guide that 
results in questions to be checked by an inspector. This model 
is similar to our proposal because it works using a reading 
technique that supports the inspector on how to review 
security. However, there are differences. First, our approach 
focuses on verifying security requirements in early stages, i.e., 
right after requirements specification and within agile 
requirement artifacts. Second, our approach addresses high-
level security requirements as defined by the Open Web 
Application Security Project (OWASP) [33], which provides a 
well-known industry standard on security. Furthermore, our 
proposal involves classifying the defects found by inspectors, 
providing a better understanding of the distribution of the 
problems.  
Carver et al. [10] further describe a set of perspectives that 
provide security-specific questions for a requirements 
inspection. Two of them are part of the PBR technique 
(designer and tester). They also created a new perspective 
based on the needs of a black hat tester. In this additional 
perspective, the reviewer focuses on three types of security 
information: cryptography, authentication, and data validation. 
According to the authors, those types of information and the 
related questions were adapted for requirements from Araujo 
and Curphey’s article on security code reviews [1]. However, 
due to the large number of software vulnerabilities and the 
variety of ways to deploy computer attacks, it is not enough to 
consider only three types of security controls. Indeed, the list 
is incomplete when compared to OWASP security properties 
and high-level security requirements.  
In the agile context, the picture is even poorer. We are 
aware of only one study that it is part of the results of a recent 
systematic mapping [42]. Domah et al. [14] propose a 
lightweight methodology to address non-functional 
requirements (NFRs) early in agile software development 
processes. NFRs elicitation, reasoning, and validation are 
considered within that methodology. Regarding verification, it 
depends on a quantification taxonomy with different levels of 
decomposition for identifying quantified validation criteria for 
each NFR. However, this methodology does not offer specific 
guidance (e.g., questions, checklist) to support inspectors in 
identifying security related defects in requirements 
specifications. Hence, previous knowledge on security is 
required to take advantage of the methodology. 
In summary, very few approaches exist to address the 
systematic analysis and detection of security problems, 
especially during early development stages, and the scenario is 
even worse in agile contexts.  
III. OUR APPROACH 
In this section, we introduce our approach for reviewing 
security-related aspects in agile requirements specifications of 
web applications. The approach aims at addressing security in 
early stages of the agile software development lifecycle and 
considers requirements specified using user stories. The 
remainder of this section describes the assumptions, the scope 
delimitation, an overview of our approach, and a motivational 
example. 
A. Assumptions 
The approach was designed with some underlying 
assumptions in mind. These assumptions are as follows. 
Requirements are specified in a user story format. Instead 
of a structured and fully described requirements document, 
requirements are typically written down via user stories 
involving free form or with some constraints [43]. For this 
reason, the approach is focused on the user story format. 
These stories are often expressed in a simple sentence using 
the role/feature/reason schema and structured as follows: As a 
[role], I want to [feature], so that [reason]. 
User stories are analyzed independently. It makes sense to 
consider one user story at a time because, typically, in agile 
methods, the features that are part of the backlog are analyzed 
separately in order to receive a “definition of ready” in order 
to be included in a sprint [43]. 
The OWASP represents a reliable baseline and standard of 
security guidelines. OWASP has a strong focus on web 
applications, the target of our approach. OWASP concerns 
providing impartial, practical information about security in 
web applications to individuals, corporations, universities, 
government agencies, and other organizations worldwide. 
Many open source security-related tools (e.g., Sonar) and 
current research (e.g., [2]) on web application security use 
OWASP as a definitive reference. Hence, we consider the 
reliability of this project as a reasonable assumption. 
B. Approach Scope Delimitation 
Hereafter, we answer some potential questions to provide a 
further understanding on the intended approach. 
For whom is the approach intended? Our approach was 
designed to support novice inspectors and security analysts. It 
provides them with a reading technique to assist the 
identification of defects related to security aspects in agile 
requirements specifications. According to Nerur [32], people 
with a high-level of competence are of vital importance in 
agile teams. Much of the knowledge in agile development is 
tacit and resides in the heads of the development team 
members [7]. Nevertheless, in an agile context, there is a focus 
on functionality. Competence in software security is typically 
not widely spread among agile practitioners [22]. Therefore, 
our approach focuses on providing a detailed reading 
technique to support novice inspectors. We believe that more 
experienced security analysts could still use the approach, but 
these are not in the scope of our evaluation. 
What security-related aspects does the approach cover? 
We decided to focus on security properties and high-level 
security requirements as proposed by the OWASP [33]. These 
high-level requirements describe the most important security-
specific features that architects and developers should include 
in every web application project [33]. The SQuaRE (the 
System and Software Quality Requirements and Evaluation) 
quality model [26] also define security-related sub-
characteristics, which hereafter, for term compatibility, will 
also be referred to as security properties. We compared the 
security properties of OWASP and SQuaRE. OWASP 
contains three security properties: confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability. The SQuaRE quality model, on the other 
hand, contains five: confidentiality, accountability, integrity, 
non repudiation, and identification and authentication. Based 
on their definitions, all of the SQuaRE security properties can 
be mapped into the OWASP security properties.  
For our final list of considered security properties, we used 
the OWASP properties with a single change, splitting 
confidentiality into two separate properties: (i) confidentiality 
and (ii) identification and authentication. I.e., we separated 
identification and authentication from other confidentiality 
problems. Table 1 presents the security properties as 
considered by our approach.  
TABLE 1.SECURITY RELATED PROPERTIES CONSIDERED BY OUR APPROACH. 
Security Property Description 
Confidentiality Degree to which the data is disclosed only as intended. 
Integrity 
Degree to which a system or component prevents 
unauthorized access to, or modification of, computer 
programs or data. 
Availability Degree to which a system or component is operational and accessible when required for use. 
Identification & 
Authentication 
Degree to which the identity of a subject or resource 
can be proved to be the one claimed. 
 
What types of requirements defects does the approach 
cover? In RE, a defect can be defined as any problem of 
correctness and completeness with respect to the requirements, 
internal consistency, or other quality attributes [39]. A 
common defect taxonomy used when inspecting requirements 
[28] is the one proposed by Shull [37]. The defect types in this 
taxonomy are: omission, ambiguity, inconsistent information, 
incorrect fact, and extraneous information. However, we 
excluded the extraneous information defect type (which 
concerns specifying requirements that are not needed). This 
decision was taken because we use the OWASP high-level 
security requirements as a reference, while they are stated as 
mandatory for inclusion; they are not necessarily complete 
given that specific security needs may sprout for specific 
applications. Hence, given the impact that a missing security 
requirement can have on the application, we did not feel 
comfortable to recommend exclusions. Table 2 shows the 
types of defects covered by our approach and its definitions. 
What kind of review technique does the approach use? 
Typically, developers and software analysts rely on ad-hoc 
methods or checklists to analyze documents. In an ad-hoc (i.e. 
unstructured) reading process, the reader is not given 
directions on how to read. The result is that reviewers tend to 
build up skills in document understanding slowly based on 
individual experiences acquired over time [36]. For this 
reason, we decided to focus the review process of our 
approach on a reading technique to increase the effectiveness 
of individual reviewers by providing a systematic guide that 
can be used to examine, in our case, security-related aspects 
and consequently identify defects. 
TABLE 2. DEFECT TYPE DEFINITIONS IN SCOPE OF OUR APPROACH. 
Defect Type Definition 
Omission (OM) Necessary information about the system has been 
omitted from the requirements. 
Ambiguity (AM) A requirement has multiple interpretations due to 
multiple terms for the same characteristic, or multiple 
meanings of a term in a particular context. 
Inconsistency (IS) Two or more requirements are in conflict with one 
another. 
Incorrect Fact (IF) A requirement asserts a fact that cannot be true under 
the conditions specified for the system. 
In which part of the lifecycle of agile methods can the 
approach be applied? Agile methods are characterized by 
having iterative structures that should allow early delivery, 
continual improvement, and rapid and flexible response to 
change [5]. Hence, we envision that our approach is used just 
before a user story is defined as “ready” for codifying.  
C. Overview of our Approach 
We propose our approach in two defined phases: (1) 
generating the focused reading techniques based on the agile 
requirements specification, and (2) following the reading 
technique to identify defects. These phases are illustrated in 
detail in Figure 1 and explained as follows. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Overall Structure of our Approach 
Phase 1: Generate Reading Technique. In order to 
generate the focused reading technique, we use Natural 
Language Processing (NLP) to extract relevant words from the 
user story. Thereafter, these words are used to identify 
security properties and to link the related OWASP high-level 
security requirements to be verified. The availability of 
automatic tools for the quality analysis of Natural Language 
requirements is recognized as a key factor for achieving 
software quality [29]. Details on how relevant words and 
security properties are identified follow.  
Extracting Relevant Words. This activity involves 
automatically analyzing user stories that describes features 
and functional requirements of the software to be built. Our 
approach extracts the relevant verb (action) of the user story 
that indicates a potential behavior be considered when 
thinking about security. In some cases, the nouns of the user 
story can also indicate situations where certain security 
features should be considered. Therefore, nouns are also 
extracted for matching purposes. The verb is extracted from 
the second block of the user story format and the nouns are 
extracted from the third block (see Table 3). 
TABLE 3. WAY TO EXTRACT THE WORDS FROM THE USER STORY. 
Type of word User story skeleton 
Verbs As a [user], I [want to], [so that]. 
Nouns As a [user], I [want to], [so that]. 
 
To extract the words, we developed a Software Framework 
for Eliciting Security Requirements from Agile Specifications 
(FESRAS)1 that uses the Stanford CoreNLP tool2 through a 
library. The Stanford CoreNLP provides a set of natural 
language analysis tools written in Java. It can take raw human 
language text input and provide the base forms of words. The 
library represents each sentence as a directed graph where the 
vertices are words and the edges are the relationships between 
them. Thereby, the software framework can take the verbs and 
nouns of the user story and then analyze them in order to link 
security properties.  
Identifying Security Properties and Linking High-Level 
Security Requirements. After identifying the relevant words of 
the user story, we need to identify security properties in order 
to map high-level security requirements that represent a set of 
security-specific features to be verified. As an example, Table 
4 shows some words that are part of the repository used to 
indicate which security properties should be considered. Our 
online material3 contains all the words of the repository.  
TABLE 4. SUBSET OF  KEYWORDS AND ITS SECURITY PROPERTIES. 
 
Keyword 
Security Property 
Confidentiality Integrity Availability Identification 
Authentication 
Access X   X 
Change  X   
Export X    
Send X    
Recover   X  
Backup   X  
Password    X 
Role    X 
Time   X  
 
This repository is strongly based on a similar one provided 
by Slankas and Williams [38] in their work about automated 
extraction of non-functional requirements in available 
documentation. The changes are that we focused on security 
                                                        
1 Framework URL temporarily omitted in order to comply with double-blind. 
2 https://github.com/stanfordnlp/CoreNLP 
3 https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.2602205 
and therefore we complemented the set of keywords with 
synonyms and more specific words stated by OWASP [33]. If 
there is no match between the extracted words and the security 
properties, our approach will automatically link the user story 
to all the security properties stored in the repository. In order 
to mitigate this scenario, synonyms of the initial set of 
keywords were added to the repository of keywords. Table 5 
shows the OWASP high-level security requirements by 
security property. 
TABLE 5. OWASP HIGH-LEVEL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FROM SECURITY 
PROPERTIES. 
Security Property OWASP High-level Security Requirement 
 
 
 
 
Confidentiality (C) 
C1. Data shall be protected from unauthorized 
observation and disclosure both in transit and 
when stored. 
C2. System sessions shall be unique to each 
individual and cannot be shared. 
C3. System sessions are invalidated when 
timed out during periods of inactivity. 
C4. TLS protocol shall be used where sensitive 
data is transmitted. 
C5. System shall use strong encryption 
algorithm at all times. 
 
 
 
Integrity (I) 
I1. Any unauthorized modification of data must 
yield an auditable security-related event. 
I2. All input is validated to be correct and fit 
for the intended purpose. 
I3. Data from an external entity shall always be 
validated. 
 
 
 
Availability (A) 
A1. The application server shall be suitably 
hardened from a default configuration. 
A2. HTTP responses contain a safe character 
set in the content type header. 
A3. Backups must be implemented and 
recovery strategies must be considered. 
 
 
 
 
Identification & 
Authentication (IA) 
IA1. Users are associated with a well-defined 
set of roles and privileges. 
IA2. The digital identity of the sender of a 
communication must be verified. 
IA3. Only those authorized are able to 
authenticate and credentials are transported and 
stored in a secure manner. 
IA4. Passwords treatment must include 
complex passphrases, options to recover and 
reset the password and default passwords not 
allowed. 
 
For each user story, the generated reading technique 
focuses the reviewer to verify whether its security 
specifications contain any of the defect types. This happens 
when reviewers check the security specifications against the 
OWASP high-level security requirements of the linked 
properties. To reach this, the reading technique contains a set 
of verification questions to help identifying the different 
defect types. Table 6 shows the questions. 
TABLE 6. VERIFICATION QUESTIONS FOR THE DIFFERENT DEFECT TYPES. 
Type of defect Question 
 
Omission 
When comparing the security specifications with the 
OWASP high-level security requirements, are there 
high-level security requirements or characteristics that 
were not specified? 
Ambiguity Does any security specification allow for multiple 
interpretations? 
Inconsistency  Are there two or more security specifications in 
conflict with one another? 
 
Incorrect Fact 
Is there any security specification stating information 
that is not true under the conditions specified for the 
system? 
Phase 2: Following the Reading Technique for Detecting 
Defects. Typically, security defects in early phases result in 
security vulnerabilities in later development phases. Hence, 
providing complete, consistent, unambiguous, and correct 
security specifications throughout the life cycle improves the 
chances for a higher quality software system. The aim of this 
phase is to guiding the reviewer on finding such requirements 
defects. Using the generated reading technique, reviewers can 
follow the instructions and answer the questions in order to 
look for defects.  
To facilitate the review task, our approach rewrites the 
OWASP high-level security requirements in a way so that 
inspectors can easily identify certain security aspects. For 
instance, we use the AND logical connector in capital letters 
to get the attention of the reader and indicate that both aspects 
must be considered to satisfy the high-level security 
requirement. E.g., “C1. Data shall be protected from 
unauthorized observation or disclosure both in transit AND 
when stored”. In this case, if the specifications were well 
specified, they must be considering security aspects related to 
data protection both in transit and in storage. Otherwise, there 
is an omission defect.  
Furthermore, the security statements also present examples 
for some concepts in order to give inspectors an idea about the 
context of the OWASP high-level security requirement. An 
example follows: “I2. All input (e.g., query parameters, string 
variables, REST calls and cookies) is validated to be correct 
and fit for the intended purpose”.  
That way, reviewers are provided with a focused reading 
technique that should increase their performance during the 
review. We give a motivational example on how the reading 
technique is used in the next section. 
D. Motivational Example 
In the following, we demonstrate the application of our 
approach in an exemplary setting. Table 7 shows a user story 
and its set of security specifications with some defects 
commonly applicable to any agile software project. 
TABLE 7.INPUT OF THE APPROACH AS AGILE REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATIONS. 
User Story Security Specification 
 
1. As a customer, I 
want to be able to 
export my personal 
information so that I 
can use it in other 
systems. 
1. The system shall ensure that there is no residual 
data exposed. 
2. The system shall store credentials securely using 
the AES encryption algorithm. 
3. The system shall use the RSA encryption 
algorithm to protect all data all the time. 
4. The system shall inactivate a session when it 
exceeds certain periods of inactivity. 
5. The system shall encrypt the roles and privileges 
of the system. 
 
With the user story in sight, the framework extracts the 
relevant words and matches the related security properties. In 
this case, the extracted words are “export” and “system”. 
Thereafter, the framework can verify whether some security 
property is related to the extracted words. In this case, 
according to Table 4, “export” matches confidentiality, while 
“system” does not match any of the security properties. 
Therefore, our approach can propose OWASP high-level 
security requirements for the confidentiality security property 
to be verified for the user story (cf. Table 5, confidentiality). 
Our approach then generates the defect reporting form by 
showing the user story with its security properties and its 
OWASP high-level security requirements, and the verification 
questions. Thus, inspectors know which security aspects they 
should verify. The verification process starts at this point.  By 
having inspectors responding to the verification questions 
looking for defects, we expect to obtain valuable insights from 
them on the quality of the security specifications. An 
exemplary enactment of answering these questions follows. 
When comparing the security specifications with the 
OWASP high-level security requirements, are there high-level 
security requirements or characteristics that were not 
specified? In this case, 3 out of 5 OWASP high-level security 
requirements linked in Table 5 are related or make sense to the 
security specifications. This means that two OWASP high-
level security requirements (C2 and C4) are not covered in the 
security specifications. Therefore, we have detected two 
defects that should be marked as “omission”. 
Does any security specification allow for multiple 
interpretations? The answer is affirmative. Security 
specification 4 (SS4) reflects a weak statement as the amount 
of time with respect to “certain periods of inactivity”. It could 
be hours or seconds. Thus, we have identified a defect related 
to ambiguity. 
Are there two or more security specifications in conflict 
with one another? In this case, the answer is affirmative. 
Security specification 2 (SS2) and security specification 3 
(SS3) are in conflict because SS3 indicates to encrypt all data 
using the RSA algorithm. Nevertheless, SS2 indicates to 
protect credentials, which are also data, using the AES 
algorithm. Thus, we have identified a defect related to 
inconsistency. 
Is there any security specification stating a characteristic 
that cannot be true under the conditions specified for the 
system? Security specification 5 (SS5) is not correct because 
concepts/functionalities of the system cannot be encrypted. The 
concept “encrypt” is not correct in the statement. 
Finally, the reviewers fill out the defect reporting form that 
summarizes the identified defects. Table 8 presents the output 
of the verification using the reading technique (a similar 
empty Table is generated and provided to the inspector during 
the task). Note that OM column is related to OWASP high-
level security requirements that were omitted. The other 
columns are related to the remaining defect types listed in 
Table 2.  
TABLE 8. DEFECT REPORTING FORM OF THE APPROACH. 
User 
story 
Security 
Property 
OWASP High-level 
Security Requirement 
OM AM IS IF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
US1  
C
on
fid
en
tia
lit
y  
C1. Data shall be 
protected from 
unauthorized observation 
AND disclosure both in 
transit AND when stored. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
SS4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SS2 
SS3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SS5 
C2. System sessions shall 
be unique to each 
individual AND cannot be 
shared. 
 
X 
C3. System sessions are 
invalidated when timed 
out during periods of 
inactivity. 
 
C4. TLS protocol shall be 
used where sensitive data 
is transmitted. 
 
X 
C5. System shall use 
strong encryption 
algorithm (e.g., DES, 
AES, RSA) at all times. 
 
In summary, this table indicates that the security 
specifications related to the user story (US1) contain six 
defects. Two out of them were marked as omission (OM) 
because none of the OWASP high-level security requirements 
(C2, C4) is related to the security specifications. The rest of 
the defects (3) are related to ambiguous, inconsistent and 
incorrect fact defects. In this case, security specification 4 
(SS4) was marked as ambiguous, security specification 2 and 
3 (SS2, SS3) were marked as inconsistent and security 
specification 5 (SS5) was marked as incorrect. 
IV. EXPERIMENT 
For a better understanding of the feasibility and impact of 
using our approach for reviewing security-related aspects in 
agile requirements specifications of web applications, we 
conducted a controlled experiment in academic settings with 
students. The choice of a controlled (difference-making) 
experiment in a laboratory setting is intended rather than being 
opportunistic, because we are specifically interested in 
investigating specific phenomena in isolation as a preparation 
for scaling our implementation (and evaluation) up to practice. 
To this end, we followed the guidelines proposed by 
Jedlitschka and Pfahl [27] and Wohlin et al. [44] for reporting 
the experiment.  
A. Experiment Goal 
We defined our study goal following the GQM (Goal 
Question Metric) template [4]. The goal is shown in Table 9.  
TABLE 9. EXPERIMENT GOAL BASED ON GQM. 
Analyze the reading technique generated by our approach 
for the purpose of Characterization 
with respect to the effectiveness, efficiency, usefulness and ease 
of use of the approach 
from the point of view  researcher (on the measured effectiveness and 
efficiency) and inspectors (on the perceived 
usefulness and ease of use) 
in the context of novice inspectors using the technique on agile 
requirements specifications, when compared to 
directly using the OWASP high-level security 
requirements and the requirements defect types. 
 
Based on our goal, we formulated two Research Questions 
(RQ). RQ1. Does the approach have an effect on defect 
detection effectiveness and efficiency? and RQ2. How do the 
inspectors perceive the usefulness and ease of use of the 
approach? The variables used to answer these RQs are 
described in detail in Subsection C.  
B. Experiment Context 
The experiment was conducted in two trials, involving 
students enrolled in Software Engineering classes at (name 
omitted for double-blind conformance). It is noteworthy that 
we also carried out a pilot study with two independent 
volunteers. The aim was to evaluate the overall (particularly 
technical) feasibility, time, adverse events, and improve the 
experiment materials before the experiment trials.  
We created the specifications based on typical customer 
requests for developing web applications, e.g., sending 
sensitive information to other software systems and deleting 
data. When doing so, we relied as an orientation on SR 
specifications from real industrial software projects as used by 
our industry partners. Our goal is to increase the similarity to 
the studied population units, but did not use real specifications 
verbatim in our setting for confidentiality reasons. 
Our SR specification contains a set of user stories in this 
format: As a [Role], I want [Feature], so that [Reason]. The 
document also contained the related security specifications 
with seeded defects. The requirements were peer-reviewed by 
three independent researchers before conducting the 
experiment trials. 
To avoid the defect seeding to represent a confounding 
factor, the type and amount of seeded defects to evaluate the 
suitability of our approach was carefully considered. Table 10 
shows the distribution of the seeded defects per user story. In 
total, 13 defects were seeded. The representativeness of the 
defects was peer reviewed by three independent researchers. 
TABLE 10. DISTRIBUTION OF THE SEEDED DEFECTS. 
User 
Story 
Omission Ambiguity Inconsistency Incorrect 
Fact 
Total 
US1 2 2 2 1 7 
US2 2 2 1 1 6 
C. Variables Selection 
The independent variable in the experiment is the 
treatment applied by the groups in order to find defects in the 
SR specifications. While the control group received OWASP 
high-level security requirements and a list of defect types to be 
found, the experimental group received our proposed reading 
technique. 
Regarding dependent variables, we used effectiveness and 
efficiency, defined as follows. Effectiveness is expressed as 
the ratio between the number of real defects found and the 
total of seeded defects in the documents. On the other hand, 
Efficiency refers to the ratio between the number of real 
defects found and the time spent in finding them. For these 
variables, we collected quantitative data to test the hypotheses 
presented in Subsection D. We also collected qualitative 
feedback in a follow-up questionnaire built on basis of the 
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) questionnaire [12]. The 
aim was to gain insights about the perceived usefulness and 
ease of use of the approach. TAM has been extensively used 
and validated for this purpose [40]. 
D. Hypotheses 
Using the variables described in the previous subsections, 
we defined the following hypotheses. 
- Null hypothesis on effectiveness (H0a): There is no 
difference in terms of effectiveness when using both 
techniques. 
- Alternative hypothesis on effectiveness (H1a): 
There is a difference in terms of effectiveness when 
using both techniques. 
- Null hypothesis on efficiency (H0b): There is no 
difference in terms of efficiency when using both 
techniques.  
- Alternative hypothesis on efficiency (H1b): There is 
a difference in terms of efficiency when using both 
techniques.  
E. Selection of Subjects 
Our subjects were intended to represent novice inspectors. 
We selected subjects, by convenience, from classes on 
Software Engineering at (name omitted for double-blind 
conformance), involving 25 undergraduate (first trial) and 8 
graduate students (second trial). 
We characterized the subjects by their experience and 
knowledge on four areas: agile software development, 
requirements engineering, software security and inspections. 
As a result, we found that the majority of students had low 
level of security experience and knowledge. We also found 
that participants are not familiar with requirements inspection 
techniques. Hence, they match our intended profile. Details of 
the characterization are presented in the online material 4 . 
Aiming at mitigating threats to validity concerning the 
distribution of subjects between groups, we used the 
characterization and applied the principles of balancing, 
blocking and random assignment (within the blocks) [44]. 
Hence, students who demonstrated knowledge on software 
security (4 out of 33) were separated and distributed equally 
into the control and the experimental groups of each trial.  
Subjects who found less than 10% of the defects were 
discarded as outliers, because, in our understanding, their 
results reflect misunderstanding or lack of interest in the 
review activity. Following this idea, we had to discard 5 
participants from the first trial. In the second trial, it was not 
necessary to discard participants. 
F. Experiment Design 
Our experiment is composed of one factor with two 
treatments: (1) using our proposed reading technique and (2) 
directly using the OWASP high-level security requirements 
and a list of defect types to be found. The study design is 
composed by a set of five activities distributed into three 
phases. Figure 2 shows how all the phases of the experiment 
were organized. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Experimental Design 
In the first phase, all the students filled out a 
characterization questionnaire with questions about their 
expertise in the topics related to the study. They also received 
training to introduce the main topics. In the second phase, we 
obtained quantitative data by conducting two trials. The 
students of each trial were divided into two groups in order to 
evaluate the performance by executing the review using or not 
our approach. Finally, in the third phase, the participants of 
the experiment gave us feedback on the execution of the 
                                                        
4 https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.2602205 
experiment. The instruments used to conduct the experiment 
are further described in the following. 
G. Instrumentation 
In order to make available the experiment package with all 
the instruments and the results, we followed open science 
policies that are available at Zenodo4. The instruments used in 
the experiment are presented as follow. 
Characterization questionnaire. The overall goal of the 
questionnaire is to characterize the experience of the students. 
The answers were obtained through the questionnaire with the 
aim at identifying some key characteristics about four 
knowledge areas: agile software development, requirements 
engineering, software security and inspections. 
Follow-up questionnaire. This questionnaire was based on 
TAM [40]. We wanted to know if the approach was useful for 
them and if they found it easy to use. Additionally, we 
included some open text questions to gather participant 
feedback about difficulties, benefits and disadvantages of 
using our approach. 
Training. The training material focused on the OWASP 
security properties and high-level security requirements and 
on the defect types. No specific training was provided on 
using the reading technique; therefore, the feasibility of using 
it without specific training was also indirectly evaluated. 
Task description. This description explains the participants 
about the received material and asks them to conduct the 
review according to their treatment, filling out the defect 
reporting form. Both treatments received the same 
requirements specification. For one treatment, the reading 
technique was generated according to the user story 
description and its related OWASP high-level security 
requirements. For the other treatment the list of OWASP 
security properties and their related high-level security 
requirements was provided together with the description of the 
defect types to be located. 
Defect reporting form. This form was used by participants 
to record the start and end time of the inspection, as well as 
the defects by location, type and description. The defect 
reporting form for the experimental group was the one 
generated for applying the reading technique, similar to the 
one shown in Table 8. 
H. Experiment Operation  
The experiment was executed along two days. On the first 
day, the subjects answered the characterization form in order 
to allow dividing them into experiment groups. On the second 
day prior to the execution of the experiment, concepts of the 
OWASP security properties, high-level security requirements, 
and relevant types of defects were reviewed by participants in 
a training session. After that, the inspection was conducted as 
follows. 
All subjects had up to 60 minutes to carry out the review. 
During the experiment, the control group used the OWASP 
high-level security requirements and a list of defect types as 
support during the inspection. The experimental group used 
our proposed reading technique. When the subjects from both 
groups finished the task, they had to fill out the follow-up 
questionnaire. The first and second trial were conducted with 
the undergraduate and graduate students, respectively. The 
aim was to obtain valuable feedback from the first trial to 
consider improvements in the second. 
I. Threats to Validity 
We organize the information on the threats to validity as 
suggested by [44]. 
Internal validity. First, aiming to avoid personal bias, we 
used researcher triangulation and all collected data was 
analyzed by three researchers. Second, we characterized all 
the participants of the experiment. The characterization 
allowed us to apply the blocking principle, which consisted of 
removing characterization-related confounding factors by 
distributing the participants so that these characteristics were 
equally distributed among the groups. Random assignment 
was employed for participants with similar characteristics. 
Balancing was applied to assure that group sizes were equally 
distributed. Finally, participants received the exact same 
training. 
Construct validity. For our quantitative analysis, we used 
metrics (effectiveness and efficiency) that are commonly used 
in inspection experiments. The qualitative analysis, on the 
other hand, relies on the TAM, which has also been widely 
used and evaluated [40].  
Conclusion (statistical) validity. This type of validity is 
strongly related with the sample size and the statistical 
methods employed during the data analysis. Besides the 
analysis procedures previously described, the statistical 
hypothesis testing methods were chosen according to the 
sample distribution. Additionally, besides statistical 
significance, we also measured the treatment effect sizes. 
External validity. As we planned to conduct a limited 
amount of trials with a limited amount of subjects, the 
experiment package is available for external replications. 
Regarding subject representativeness, we used students to 
represent novice inspectors. Using students as participants 
remains a valid simplification of real-life settings needed in 
laboratory contexts [17]. Regarding the used objects, we also 
peer-reviewed the requirements specifications and the seeded 
defects in terms of their representativeness. 
V. RESULTS 
In the following, we present the results of our controlled 
experiment. In addition, we describe the data collection and 
analysis procedure to get the answer to the research questions.  
We executed three steps to collect the data necessary for 
answering our research questions. First, we collected the 
number of real defects found. Based on this data it is possible 
to evaluate the performance of the treatments in terms of 
effectiveness. This metric is used to partially answer RQ1. 
Furthermore, we collected the time spent for detecting defects. 
This allows us to compare the performance of the treatments 
in terms of efficiency, which is the metric that complements 
the answer to RQ1. Finally, we collected answers from the 
follow-up questionnaire. This questionnaire allowed us to 
receive feedback on the perceived usefulness and ease of use. 
This provides information for answering RQ2. 
Regarding analysis procedure, we conducted both, 
quantitative (RQ1) and qualitative analyses (RQ2). Related to 
quantitative analysis, descriptive statistics of our experiment 
trials were based on the above described metrics. Thereafter, 
to answer RQ1, statistical hypothesis testing was applied. Our 
analysis was conducted using the statistical tool RStudio 
version 1.1.423. For hypotheses testing, the data analyst used 
the Mann-Whitney non-parametrical test with α = 0.05. This 
choice of statistical significance level and test was motivated 
by the small and independent samples. For the qualitative 
analysis, on the other hand, we present the frequencies related 
to the TAM questionnaire. Additionally, grounded theory 
coding activities were applied to obtain further understand 
difficulties, benefits, and disadvantages.    
RQ1: Does the approach have an effect on defect detection 
effectiveness and efficiency? 
We wanted to understand the potential of the approach to 
detect security defects in agile specifications of web 
applications. For this, we compared the performance of using 
our approach versus the review based on the OWASP high-
level security requirements and a list of defect types. 
Regarding the effectiveness, Figure 3 shows the distribution of 
the amount of defects found by the students in each trial.  
 
Fig. 3 Defect detection effectiveness 
It is possible to observe that in both trials our approach 
was more effective than the other review. In the first trial, the 
students who used our approach identified, in median, 54% of 
the defects while those who did not use it identified 23%. The 
difference was even stronger when observing the performance 
of the graduate students (second trial). Graduate students who 
used our approach identified, in median, 69% of the defects 
versus 23% identified by the students who did not use it. The 
improvement for the graduate trial may have happened 
because we slightly modified the defect reporting form for the 
experimental group in the second trial to ease understanding 
and fulfillment (equivalent to the one shown in Table 8). The 
reason was that several inspectors mentioned in the first trial’s 
follow-up questionnaire that the defect reporting form was 
confusing. In other words, we improve the design of the defect 
reporting form, while it remained capturing the exact same 
information. 
We also wanted to test our null hypothesis on the 
effectiveness (H0a), i.e., we checked whether these differences 
were significant. The results of the tests allowed to reject the 
null hypothesis for both trials (p-values of 0.002 and 0.012 for 
the first and second trial, respectively); this means there is 
significant difference in terms of effectiveness between our 
approach and the other defect-based technique. In addition, we 
calculated the Cohen's effect size [41] for both trials (3.46 and 
2.24 for graduate and undergraduate students, respectively). 
Thus, we can partially answer RQ1: Our approach has a 
positive impact on defect detection effectiveness with very 
large effect size. 
After knowing the effectiveness of our approach, we can 
question its efficiency by analyzing the defects found per hour 
by the inspectors. Figure 4 shows the distribution of the 
efficiency of the students involved in the experiment per trial. 
Note that the efficiency follows the same pattern of the 
effectiveness. That is, the amount of defects found per hour by 
the inspectors who used our approach was greater than the one 
of the inspectors who used the other technique. In the first 
trial, the median of our approach efficiency was 15 defects 
found per hour (we seeded only 13 defects, but participants 
took less than one hour to complete their tasks), while the 
median of the other one was four. In the second trial, the 
median of our approach efficiency increased to 21 defects 
found per hour versus four defects found per hour by the 
control group. I.e., inspectors who used our approach 
identified defects faster. 
 
Fig. 4 Defect detection efficiency 
Regarding the statistical hypothesis testing for efficiency, 
we found that the Mann-Whitney Test suggests rejecting our 
second null hypothesis (p-values of 0.02 and 0.01 for the first 
and second trial respectively). This means there is significant 
difference in terms of efficiency between our approach and the 
OWASP review. Additionally, the relevance of this difference 
(Cohen's effect size [41]) was very large for both trials (1.56 
and 3.29 for undergraduate students and graduate students 
respectively). With this information, we can fully answer 
RQ1. Our approach has a positive impact on security defect 
detection effectiveness and efficiency, when compared to 
directly using the OWASP high-level security requirements 
and the requirements defect types as basis for verification. 
RQ2: How do the inspectors perceive the usefulness and 
ease of use of the approach? 
After inspectors reviewed the security specifications, we 
asked if they found the approach useful and easy to use. 
Through the TAM questionnaire, we wanted to know about 
their perceptions on using the approach. All those who used 
our approach strongly agreed (75%) or partially agreed (25%) 
that their performance improved in some way (find defects 
faster). This last one perception may be strongly related with 
the lack of experience and security knowledge of the 
inspectors and difficulties faced by them when conducting the 
review. For instance, one inspector stated the following: “The 
review may be exhausting and time consuming due to the task 
description document is not lightweight”. The inspectors also 
mentioned some difficulties faced such as “confusing defect 
reporting form” and “requirement specifications are too 
abstract”. 
Regarding ease of use, again all those who used our 
approach strongly agreed (17%) or partially agreed (83%). 
The large number of partial agreements indicates that 
improvements could be introduced in order to facilitate the use 
of the approach. According to the follow-up questionnaire, the 
inspectors proposed some points that may improve the 
understanding of the approach such as providing a lighter 
document, modifying the design of the defect reporting form 
and showing an example of how to fill it out correctly. This is 
convincing because some inspectors reported difficulties to 
adopt the approach. On the other hand, three undergraduate 
students mentioned that once the review process using the 
approach is understood, the detection of defects is simple.  
VI. DISCUSSION 
In this section, we discuss potential practical implications 
of our research for practitioners and researchers. For 
practitioners, our approach provides a way to detect defects 
related to security aspects that should be specified. According 
to the results of the controlled experiment, we are confident to 
say that in principle our approach supports novice inspectors 
by providing guidance in applying a reading technique that 
will help them to identify defects in agile requirements 
specifications of web applications. In addition, we designed 
the approach in such a way that it works without expensive 
review cycles, aligned with the agile philosophy. We see three 
main potential benefits of this approach. First, narrowing the 
security knowledge gap that exists between experts and novice 
inspectors. Second, the reading technique provides a strong 
focus on security aspects. In this way, the team can avoid 
discussing obvious issues and focus on important, difficult, 
security-specific aspects of the review. Third, we saw that our 
approach provided positive results regarding the performance 
of individual inspectors when conducting the review. 
For researchers, this work contributes already in closing an 
important literature gap that exists with respect to security 
requirements verification in the agile context. Based on the 
scarce literature on the topic, we believe that our approach 
constitutes an interesting starting point to discuss in depth 
verification activities centered on security in the agile context. 
For us, the results strengthen our confidence in further 
extending our approach to scale its usability up to practical 
settings covering a full, too-supported process integration, 
which was not (and could not be) in scope of a development in 
our research-centric environment. 
VII. LIMITATIONS 
We concentrated on a set of concrete security properties 
and high-level security requirements from the OWASP 
(matching security sub characteristics also described in the 
SQuaRE quality model [26]). There are several security 
standards and guidelines that are different to the ones provided 
by the OWASP project [33]. This means that we could 
complement the security vision of our approach with other 
standards.  
Moreover, given the complexity of working with natural 
language in RE, there is a limitation related to the 
completeness of the keyword repository needed to link the 
user stories with the security properties. To deal with this, we 
decided to consider as many synonyms as possible regarding 
the initial set of keywords.  
We are also aware that our security specifications 
constitute a limitation of the study. In a perfect scenario, we 
would have security concerns specified by companies or 
independent practitioners, but often this information is 
restricted. Therefore, we invested our best efforts to carefully 
create and verify the specifications on their representativeness. 
Nevertheless, external replications, including a wider range of 
user stories and security specifications, are needed to improve 
external validity of our results.  
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We proposed an approach for reviewing security related 
aspects in agile requirements specifications of web 
applications. The approach considers user stories and security 
specifications as inputs and involves applying NLP in order to 
relate those user stories to candidate security properties and 
high-level security requirements proposed by the OWASP. As 
a result, the approach provides a user story focused reading 
technique that can be used to support the manual inspection of 
agile specifications. 
We validated the approach by designing and conducting 
two trials of a controlled experiment. The purpose was to 
validate the feasibility of using our approach for detecting 
defects related to security aspects in web applications. In these 
trials, our approach had a positive effect on defect detection 
effectiveness and efficiency. Inspectors who used our 
approach identified more defects in less time than inspectors 
who conducted the inspection using the OWASP high-level 
security requirements and a list of defect types. In principle, 
participants found the reading technique generated by our 
approach useful and easy to use.    
Future work includes to evaluate and understand the 
performance of using our approach in industry settings and 
when compared to other inspection techniques (e.g., PBR-
security [10], even though it was not designed for the agile 
context). Furthermore, we consider it important to follow an 
exemplary process integration, e.g., by further automatizing the 
approach within the FESCAR framework, in such a way that 
applying the reading technique could be guided by the 
framework. This could help mitigating difficulties mentioned 
by the participants of the experiment. In addition, we are aware 
that our repository of keywords is still limited and that our 
approach could be evolved beyond exact keyword matching.  
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